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I. INTRODUCTION
In February 1996, New Jersey first-grader "Z.H." was rewarded
for his reading skills. Z.H.'s teacher, Ms. Oliva, allowed students
reaching a certain reading proficiency to read a book of their own
choosing to the rest of the class) Z.H. chose to read "A Big Family,"
a story adapted from Genesis included in The Beginner's Bible.2
"However, because of its religious content, Ms. Oliva did not allow
Z.H. to read the story to the class. Instead, although the other
students were allowed to read their nonreligious stories to the class, he
was allowed to read the story only to Ms. Oliva."3 After unsuccess-
fully requesting that Z.H. be allowed to read his story to the class,
Z.H. and his mother filed suit against the local Board of Education and
the State Department of Education alleging a violation of "Z.H.'s
rights to Freedom of Expression under the First Amendment." 4 The
district court granted the defendants' motions for judgment on the
pleadings.5 The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed
without comment.
While it is pleasing to recall that students and teachers do not lose
their constitutional rights at the schoolhouse gate,6 we know that
students and teachers do not enjoy their constitutional rights as fully
within the schoolhouse as when they are outside of it. Within the
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1. C.H. exrel. v. Oliva, 990 F. Supp. 341, 346 (D.N.J. 1997), affd, 166 F.3d 1204 (3d Cir.
1998) (hereinafter C.H. v. Olivia). "The material was subject to review by Ms. Oliva to ensure
that it would be suitable in length and complexity for first grade students." Id. at 346 n.2.
2. Id.
3. Id. at 347.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 356.
6. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
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American schoolhouse, the robust freedoms of religious exercise and of
speech are restricted. C.H. v. Oliva highlights the difficulty of
determining how tight this restriction must be, especially when the
conduct at issue is not only within the schoolhouse, but within the
elementary school classroom.
Freedom of speech was clearly important to the framers of our
Constitution and has remained a valued freedom over the past two
centuries. It is understandable that Z.H.'s family would sense that
something had gone awry when Z.H. was not allowed to read his story.
Although Z.H. does have a right to some protected speech within the
classroom setting, it is also clear that the framers valued religious
liberty. Part of their plan to protect this liberty was the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment-an effort to leave religious choices
within the hands of citizens and out of the reach of government.
Thus, it is understandable that the school district may have seen it as
the district's constitutional duty to prohibit Z.H. from reading his
story. Moreover, it is understandable that many parents would expect
the school district to prohibit Z.H.'s presentation, believing that the
Constitution preserves the freedom to send their children to public
school without fear that the children will be coerced or proselytized.
This tension between the Free Speech Clause and the Establishment
Clause is not new. Part of the reason why the tension lingers is the
lack of clear standards. Judges and attorneys, not to mention students,
parents, and teachers, are left to wonder if and when one clause has
priority over the other and what the standards are for making such a
decision.
Accepting Oliva as a paradigm example, this Article attempts to
ease the Free Speech Clause-Establishment Clause tension in the
context of student religious speech within the public classroom. In
Part II, momentarily leaving the Establishment Clause aside, this
Article evaluates the degree of freedom which Z.H. and student
speakers like him have to speak within the elementary school classroom
and asserts that where student expression is not school-sponsored and
does not occur in a "nonpublic" forum, Tinker v. Des Moines Indepen-
dent Community School District7 governs the scope of protection for
this expression. In Part III, this Article examines the Establishment
Clause defense to determine whether it acts to prohibit religious speech




Advisory Board v. Pinette,8 courts should not apply the Establishment
Clause to student religious expression in the classroom.
This Article makes two observations, both in Parts II and III, that
have received insufficient attention in the academic literature and in the
courts. First, students in public school classrooms are "captive
speakers." Due to compulsory attendance laws, students are "captive"
not only when hearing speech, but also when they wish to speak.
Adhering to the First Amendment means protecting not only captive
listeners, but also captive speakers. Second, in the face of the potential
misperception of students that their school endorses the speech of a
fellow student, teachers have an extraordinary opportunity to simulta-
neously disclaim endorsement and teach the fundaments of religious
liberty. Rather than treating students as static and incapable of
distinguishing between state-sponsored and private religious expression,
teachers should explain the distinction, along with the importance the
Constitution assigns to religious expression.
II. FREE SPEECH WITHIN THE CLASSROOM WALLS
The first issue of importance is whether, aside from the Establish-
ment Clause, Z.H. had the right to speak freely in his classroom. If
he did not have this right-if the school district could curtail his
speech for reasons unrelated to the Establishment Clause-the issue of
whether the Establishment Clause may restrict student religious speech
in the classroom is irrelevant.9
In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District,
the Supreme Court considered the right of junior high and high school
8. 515 U.S. 753 (1995).
9. See, e.g., DeNooyer v. Livonia Pub. Sch., 799 F. Supp. 744, 754 n. 8 (E.D. Mich. 1992),
affd, 12 F.3d 211 (6th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1031 (1994) (not reaching the
Establishment Clause issue after deciding second-grader's right to speak was not infringed).
Establishment Clause analysis would also be unnecessary if Z.H. colorably alleged a violation
of the Free Exercise Clause. Although the Oliva court stated that "the complaint clearly alleges
deprivation of rights secured by the Constitution-Free Exercise of Religion," the Free Exercise
Clause apparently was not directly at issue in the case. Oliva, 990 F. Supp. at 352. Because Z.H.
had a freedom of speech claim-one constitutional provision that provided him with at least a
facial right to religious expression-it is unimportant for the purpose of this article whether he
could make a Free Exercise claim as well.
The questioned conduct in Oliva might be protected by both the Free Speech Clause and
the Free Exercise Clause. The Supreme Court and commentators alike agree that these two
clauses somewhat overlap. See Pinette, 515 U.S. at 767-68 (plurality opinion); Bd. of Educ. of
Westside Community Sch. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250 (1990); Douglas G. Laycock, Religious
Liberty as Liberty, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 313, 348-52 (1996). However, some
commentators suggest that the Free Exercise Clause provides no protection for religious speech
that is not otherwise provided by the Free Speech Clause. See William P. Marshall, Religion as
Ideas: Religion as Identity, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 385, 392-404 (1996).
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students to wear black armbands at school in order to protest the
hostilities in Vietnam."0 The Court held that the students had the
right to wear the armbands at school and that the school authorities
could prohibit speech only when they could reasonably "forecast
substantial disruption of or material interference with school activi-
ties."" Conduct that "materially disrupts classwork or involves
substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others is, of course, not
immunized by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech."' 2
The Court stated:
The school officials banned and sought to punish petitioners for a
silent, passive expression of opinion, unaccompanied by any disorder
or disturbance on the part of petitioners. There is here no evidence
whatever of petitioners' interference, actual or nascent, with the
school's work or of collision with the rights of other students to be
secure and to be let alone. Accordingly, this case does not concern
speech or action that intrudes upon the work of the schools or the
rights of other students. 3
But the Court clarified that its holding did not apply only to silent
expression:
Any departure from absolute regimentation may cause trouble. Any
variation from the majority's opinion may inspire fear. Any word
spoken, in class, in the lunchroom, or on the campus, that deviates
from the views of another person may start an argument or cause a
disturbance. But our Constitution says we must take this risk, and
our history says that it is this sort of hazardous freedom-this kind
of openness-that is the basis of our national strength and of the
independence and vigor of Americans who grow up and live in this
relatively permissive, often disputatious, society."
Nearly twenty years after Tinker, in Hazelwood School District v.
Kuhlmeier, the Supreme Court considered the extent to which school
officials can exercise control over the contents of a high school
newspaper produced as part of the school's journalism class.' The
Court distinguished the case from Tinker primarily in two ways. First,
10. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504.
11. Id. at 514.
12. Id. at 513.
13. Id. at 507.
14. Id. at 508-09 (citing Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949)).
15. 484 U.S. 260, 262 (1988). Specifically, the school principal banned certain articles
concerning divorce and pregnancy from the newspaper. Id. at 263-64.
[Vol. 22:741
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the Court found that the school newspaper was not a "public fo-
rum."1  "Accordingly, school officials were entitled to regulate the
contents of [the newspaper] in any reasonable manner. It is this
standard, rather than our decision in Tinker that governs this case."17
Second, the Hazelwood Court asserted that Tinker sets forth the
standard for appropriately punishing student speech, but not "for
determining when a school may refuse to lend its name and resources
to the dissemination of student expression."18
The Court explained:
The question whether the First Amendment requires a school to
tolerate particular student speech-the question that we addressed
in Tinker-is different from the question whether the First Amend-
ment requires a school affirmatively to promote particular student
speech. The former question addresses educators' ability to silence
a student's personal expression that happens to occur on the school
premises. The latter question concerns educators' authority over
school-sponsored publications, theatrical productions, and other
expressive activities that students, parents, and members of the
public might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the
school. These activities may fairly be characterized as part of the
school curriculum, whether or not they occur in a traditional
classroom setting, so long as they are supervised by faculty members
and designed to impart particular knowledge or skills to student
participants and audiences. 9
Thus, the Hazelwood Court indicated that the standard it applied is
appropriate (and the Tinker standard is inappropriate) where the speech
in question (1) occurs in a nonpublic forum and (2) is school-spon-
sored.
21
16. Id. at 267-70. See infra Part II.A. (discussion of forum analysis). The Tinker Court
made no mention of forum analysis.
17. Id. at 270 (citing Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46
(1983)).
18. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 277-78 (emphasis added).
19. Id. at 270-71 (emphasis added). The Court found that banning the articles in the school
newspaper was constitutionally permissible. Id. at 276.
20. It is arguable that these two factors are merely two aspects of one inquiry. That is,
where an expression is school-sponsored, the location or program in which the expression occurs
is not a public forum. Likewise, whatever speech occurs within a nonpublic forum at a school
is sponsored by the school. See Ruti Teitel, The Unconstitutionality of Equal Access Policies and
Legislation Allowing Organized Student-Initiated Religious Activities in the Public High Schools: A
Proposal for a Unitary First Amendment Forum Analysis Test, 12 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 529
(1986).
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A. Forum Analysis
One's right to speak is subject to numerous qualifications
depending on the content of the speech.21 Additionally, the level of
protection that speech receives depends upon the location of the
speaker. 2  The government may curtail private speech depending
upon whether the speaker is on government property, what type of
government property it is, and the degree of control the government
has exercised over access to the property. Under the Supreme Court's
"forum analysis," courts decide whether the government property or
program at issue is a traditional public forum, a designated public
forum, or a nonpublic forum.
A "traditional public forum" is a place "which by long tradition
or government fiat ha[s] been devoted to assembly and debate.
23
Thus, the government generally does not establish traditional public
fora. Instead, these fora are recognized by the long-held traditions and
common practice that surround them. The classic examples of this
type of fora are parks and sidewalks.24 The government may restrict
private speech in a traditional public forum on the basis of the speech's
content, but only to serve a compelling state interest that the restriction
is narrowly drawn to achieve.25
In contrast to a traditional pubic forum, a "designated public
forum" (also called a "limited public forum") is government property
that the government has effectively "open[ed] for indiscriminate public
use for communicative purposes. ' 26  Hence, unlike a traditional
public forum, the government must actively create a designated public
21. The State may curtail, or not protect, speech that is imminently dangerous (see, e.g.,
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963));
distinctly commercial (see, e.g., Bd. of Trustees of State Univ. of New York v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469
(1989)); or of decidedly low value (e.g., obscenity).
22. See, e.g., Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788 (1985);
Hague v. Committee for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
23. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45; see also Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800 (finding the purpose of this
type of forum to be the "free exchange of ideas").
24. See, e.g., Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 391
(1993).
25. See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800; Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
26. Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 392; see also Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 267 ("[T]he
government does not create a [designated] public forum by inaction or by permitting limited
discourse, but only by intentionally opening a nontraditional forum to public discourse.");
Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 817 (Blackmun & Brennan, JJ., dissenting) (defining this type of public
forum as "government property which the government has opened for use as a place for
expressive activity for a limited amount of time, or for a limited class of speakers, or for a limited
number of topics"); Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
[Vol. 22:741
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forum. As with a traditional public forum, the government may
impose a content-based restriction on speech in a designated public
forum only if the restriction serves a compelling state interest and is
narrowly drawn to achieve that end.27
A "nonpublic forum" (also called a "closed forum") is property
that the government has not opened to the public.2" The government
need not have a compelling state interest in order to regulate speech in
a nonpublic forum, but subject matter and speaker distinctions must
be "reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum and [must
be] viewpoint neutral."29
The Hazelwood Court said that Tinker did not apply because the
forum at issue, the school newspaper, was a nonpublic forum.30
According to the reasoning in Hazelwood, in cases involving student
expression, the courts must determine whether the location (or
program) in which the speech occurred is a nonpublic forum. Several
courts have declined to make this determination (or have made it
implicitly)-treating forum analysis as irrelevant to student expression
on school grounds.3' This treatment makes sense because there is no
question as to whether the student speakers have the right to be at the
school.32 As constitutional scholar Douglas Laycock asserts:
27. See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800; Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
28. See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 819 (Blackmun & Brennan, JJ., dissenting) (defining a
nonpublic forum as "property that is not compatible with general expressive activity").
29. Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 393 (quoting Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 806).
30. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 267-70.
31. See Seamons v. Snow, 84 F.3d 1226, 1237 (10th Cir. 1996) (applying Tinker after
deciding student speech about hazing incident was not school-sponsored); Burch v. Barker, 861
F.2d 1149, 1159 (9th Cir. 1988) (challenge to school district policy requiring approval of all
student-written material prior to distribution at high school); Phillips v. Anderson County Sch.
Dist. Five, 987 F. Supp. 988, 492-94 (D.S.C. 1997) (applying Tinker); Duran v. Nitsche, 780 F.
Supp. 1048, 1053 n.3 (E.D. Pa. 1991) ("The court recognizes the emerging line of cases holding
that public forum analysis is not appropriate in all free speech/public school cases. These cases
have intimated that public forum concepts are not applicable when the speech is not school
sponsored.") (citation omitted), order vacated, appeal dism'd, 972 F.2d 1331 (3rd Cir. 1992);
Slotterback v. Interboro Sch. Dist., 766 F. Supp. 280, 290 (E.D. Pa. 1991) ("Because Tinker
merely involved students' personal expression during school hours in a place where the students
were entitled to be, Tinker and factually similar cases have nothing to do with a school's status
as a public forum."); Rivera v. East Otero Sch. Dist. R-1, 721 F. Supp. 1189, 1193 (D. Colo.
1989) ("[W]hether or not a school campus is available as a public forum to others, it is clear that
the students, who of course are required to be in school, have the protection of the First
Amendment while they are lawfully in attendance."); Muller v. Jefferson Lighthouse Sch., 98 F.3d
1530, 1546 (7th Cir. 1996) (Rovner, J., concurring).
32. Justice O'Connor and Justice Brennan have recognized this point:
There may be important differences between cases in which citizens have a legal right
to be present on government property and those in which "citizens claim a right to enter
government property for the particular purpose of speaking." Douglas Laycock, Equal
Access and Moments of Silence: The Equal Access Status of Religious Speech by Private
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When citizens claim a right to enter government property for the
particular purpose of speaking, it is relevant to ask whether other
speakers have been allowed the same privilege, or whether the
property is particularly appropriate for speech. The various versions
of the public forum doctrine address these questions. But public
forum analysis is irrelevant when access is not an issue. When
citizens are going about their business in a place they are entitled to
be, they are presumptively entitled to speak.33
Laycock's assertion is consistent with the Supreme Court's use of
public forum analysis. In Hazelwood there was no question as to
whether the students were allowed access to the school. The issue
centered around the scope of their access to the school newspaper. It
was the school newspaper, not the school itself, that the Court found
to be a nonpublic forum.34 Moreover, before the Court decided
whether the students had the right to publish the specific articles
censored by the principal, it considered whether the students -had any
right at all to "speak" through the newspaper.3" That is, before the
Court decided that school officials were justified in restricting the
challenged articles, the Court decided the threshold question of
whether the students had an independent right of access to the
newspaper. The Court concluded that the students did not-their
access to the newspaper was at the indulgence of the school district."
In Lamb's Chapel v. Center for Moriches Union Free School
District, a church sued a school district, alleging that the district
violated the Constitution by denying the church access to school
facilities for a religious-oriented film series on child-rearing, when the
facilities were otherwise available during nonschool hours for social,
civic, recreational, and political uses.37 As in Hazelwood, the Court
engaged in forum analysis, but only after it concluded that the
Speakers, 81 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 48 (1986), cited in Board of Airport Comm'rs of Los
Angeles v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569, 573 (1987) (O'Connor, J.). In the former
class of cases-into which the instant case falls-the Court has recognized that when
citizens are going about their business in a place they are entitled to be, they are
presumptively entitled to speak. See Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. at 416.
United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 744 n.2 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (holding that
Post Office sidewalk was not traditional public forum and that Postal Service regulations
prohibiting solicitation on Post Office premises did not violate Free Speech Clause).
33. Laycock, supra note 32, at 48. But see DeNooyer, 799 F. Supp. at 752 ("The Supreme
Court has not made the 'use' versus 'access' distinction.").
34. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 268-70.
35. See id. at 269 (noting that the students' assertion that "they could publish 'practically
anything." in the newspaper was unfounded).
36. See id.
37. 508 U.S. at 387-89.
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plaintiffs had no right to access the district's property apart from the
district's "opening" of the property."
In Rosenberger v. University of Virginia, a student organization that
published a Christian newspaper challenged the university's refusal to
disperse funds to the group from the Student Activity Fund (SAF), a
fund created by the university to pay for a broad range of extracurricu-
lar student activities.3 9  University policy allowed several of the
student groups recognized as Contracted Independent Organizations
(CIOs) to get the SAF reimbursement.4" While the plaintiff student
group, Wide Awake Productions, had become a CIO, the university
had denied the group SAF funding.4 As in Hazelwood and Lamb's
Chapel, the Court used forum analysis.42  But once again, this
analysis was appropriate only because the plaintiffs did not have a right
to access the university programs apart from the right granted by the
university."
Whereas in Hazelwood, Lamb's Chapel, and Rosenberger, the
plaintiffs asserting freedom to speak had no independent entitlement
to enter and speak upon the property (or program) in issue, this was
not the situation in Tinker.
Because students were indisputably entitled to be on the school
grounds, the only question in Tinker was whether the school had a
constitutionally sufficient reason to suppress their speech. The
Court's requirement that the school show a material and substantial
interference with the educational function is addressed to that
question.44
Unlike in Hazelwood, Lamb's Chapel, and Rosenberger, where the
defendants had the right to ban entrance by the plaintiffs (and others)
38. Id. at 391 ("[T]he [School] District need not have permitted after-hours use of its
property for any of the uses" allowed by state law). The Court found that since the school
district allowed groups with other perspectives on family values and child-rearing to use the
facilities, the district had committed viewpoint discrimination and, thus, it was unconstitutional
to exclude the church from using the facilities. Id. at 394-97.
39. 515 U.S. 819, 823-24 (1995).
40. Id. at 823.
41. Id. at 825.
42. Id. at 829-30. As in Lamb's Chapel, the Court actually based its decision upon
viewpoint discrimination. Id. Viewpoint discrimination is unconstitutional even in a nonpublic
forum. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
43. See id. at 823 ("CIO status is available to any group the majority of whose members
are students, whose managing officers are full-time students, and that complies with certain
procedural requirements.").
44. Laycock, supra note 32, at 48.
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to the government property, the Tinker plaintiffs were actually
compelled to be on the government property.
Even if sympathetic to the idea of rejecting forum analysis in cases
where students speak on school grounds generally, forum analysis
proponents may charge that student speech in the classroom is a
category unto itself. While students may have some leeway to "go
about their business" during lunch, passing periods, and recreation
times, they are not at such leisure in the classroom. In the classroom,
students are to be actively learning and participating in a program led
by the teacher. Forum analysis proponents may assert that this is not
a time for broad discourse, religious or otherwise--especially in an
elementary school.
This assertion is mostly, but not completely, accurate. While the
student in the classroom and the student on the playground both have
unquestioned access to their locations, the student in the classroom
does not have the same liberty to speak as does the one on the
playground. This is no reason, however, to engage in forum analysis;
to the contrary, it is a reason to apply Tinker, where the appropriate
standard for determining the degree of protection for the speech is to
inquire whether the speech in question materially and substantially
interferes with the educational function. The standard is responsive to
the educational setting: Speech that is not substantially disruptive on
the playground may very well be substantially disruptive in the
classroom. Under Tinker, school officials can censor the latter, but not
the former. In both scenarios, though, school officials must be able to
substantiate their forecast of disruption.45 Unfounded fears do not
justify censorship in the classroom any more than they do on the
playground.46
45. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509 ("[U]ndifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is
not enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression.").
46. In Settle v. Dickson County School Board, a ninth-grade teacher assigned her class a four-
source research paper, requiring only that each paper topic be "interesting, researchable and
decent." 53 F.3d 152, 153 (6th Cir. 1995). A student sued under the Free Speech Clause when
the teacher refused to accept a research paper entitled "The Life of Jesus Christ" and gave the
student a "zero" for failing to write on another topic. Id. Applying the Tinker standard, and
asking whether the topic of Jesus materially disrupted classwork or involved substantial disorder,
would have made Settle a case easily decided for the plaintiff. Instead, applying a categorical
"classroom" rule, and based on the flawed conclusion that the Hazelwood Court found the school
newspaper to be an "open forum," (cf. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 268-70 (finding that the newspaper
was not a public forum)), the Settle court concluded that "[w]here learning is the focus, as in the
classroom, student speech may be even more circumscribed than in the school newspaper or other




A second issue to consider in determining whether to apply Tinker
or Hazelwood is whether the speech was sponsored by the school.
Importantly, the Hazelwood Court acknowledged that there is speech
that merely "happens to occur" at school.47 An example of this
speech, the Court noted, was the wearing of armbands by the Tinker
students in the classroom.48 The Court contrasted this "happening"
with "activities that students, parents, and members of the public
might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school."49
An example of school-sponsored speech is a publication or a theatrical
production."0 By the Court's reasoning, nonschool-sponsored and
school-sponsored student expression are two distinguishable situations
that call for two different standards. The distinction would be
meaningless if one of the scenarios swallowed the other. Despite how
little we may know about the parameters of each category, we know
definitely that neither category encompasses the other. Thus, even if
parents, members of the public, or fellow students were to perceive
that Tinker-like student expression is sponsored by the school, this
perception would not be reasonable and Tinker, rather than Hazelwood,
should control the extent to which school officials may regulate student
expression. Even so, three further concerns merit discussion.
1. Compulsory Attendance
Some argue that the fact that students are compelled by law to be
in the classroom creates per se school sponsorship of whatever speech
occurs there.5 ' Yet the Hazelwood Court showed that this conclusion
is incorrect. Despite compulsory school attendance, the Court said that
student expression that merely "happens" at school is not sponsored
47. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271.
48. Id.
49. Id. (emphasis added).
50. Id.
51. See, e.g., Ira C. Lupu, To Control Faction and Protect Liberty: A General Theory of the
Religion Clauses, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL IssuEs 357, 371 (1996) ("In those school settings
accompanied by compulsory attendance requirements, state-sponsored religious exercises infringe
the religious liberty of those coercively required to attend. With or without coercion, neutrality
is impossible in these settings; majority religion and favored sects will always dominate the
enterprise."); Leah Gallant Morgenstein, Note, Board of Education of Westside Community Schools
v. Mergens: Three "R's" + Religion = Mergens, 41 AM. U. L. REv. 221, 230 n.50 (1991)
("Compulsory attendance laws, the impressionability of young students, and the potential
perception of school sponsorship combine to make the public school a sensitive forum for equal
access considerations.").
1999]
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by the school.12  Indeed, the Court's example of a nonschool-spon-
sored expression-the students wearing armbands in Tinker-occurred
in a classroom full of students compelled to be in that classroom.1
3
While compulsory attendance may be problematic in other ways, 4 it
is not a reason to treat all student speech within the classroom as
school- sponsored speech.
2. Aggregate Number of Speakers
Some also might argue that a school sponsors student expression
when the aggregate number of speakers from a particular viewpoint is
especially high. That is, when the vast majority of a classroom
expresses the same ideas, the school sponsors that expression de facto.
Admittedly, as a practical matter, a standard more stringent than the
Tinker standard might be desirable where, for example, eighteen of
twenty third-graders in a Texas school read Bible stories during their
respective turns to "show and tell." The substantial disruption
standard might be insufficient to completely protect the lone Buddhist
student in the class. This scenario is problematic on a personal and
social level, which I address below.5 However, this scenario is not
problematic on the constitutional level.
As a constitutional matter, the Free Speech Clause protects each
student speaker. The protection is an individual right. It would be
unreasonable5 6 to diminish an individual student's protection because
he sought to exercise his right in close proximity of time or space to
other students exercising the same right. For example, we would not
say that people protesting as a group deserve less Free Speech
protection because they might persuade or intimidate those against
whom they protest. Moreover, reducing speakers' protection because
they all come from one viewpoint would be a form of viewpoint
discrimination, a clear violation of the Free Speech Clause. 7
52. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271.
53. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 516 (Black, J., dissenting) ("Here the constitutional right to
'political expression' asserted was a right to wear black armbands during school hours and at
classes.").
54. See infra Part II.D. (discussion of captive audience) and Part III (discussion of
Establishment Clause).
55. See infra Part II.C. (discussion of emotional harm to young listeners).
56. See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271 ("expressive activities that students, parents, and
members of the public might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school").
57. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829. This is not to mention the administrative difficulty
of the school deciding when several speakers come from "one" viewpoint.
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As the Hazelwood Court noted, a finding of school sponsorship
may be based on a reasonable perception by students.58 The schools
are in a great position to clarify for students what is or is not spon-
sored by the school. Even if there is a large number of speakers with
the same viewpoint, a teacher can explain in simplified terms that the
Constitution protects each student's right to speak.
3. Age
A third concern is that, because of their youth and immaturity,
elementary school children often mistake "pure" student expression for
school-sponsored student expression. As the Oliva court noted,
At this age [first grade], it is quite reasonable to assume that these
children could have been easily confused whether or not Z.H.'s
teacher merely let Z.H. read his book, or if she approved of its
message. Presenting the book to the teacher for approval was part
of the standard procedure of that class activity; consequently, the
books that were allowed to be read were those approved by the
teacher. It is likely that some first-grade students would not fully
understand all of the reasons why something could be unsuitable for
use in a school activity and could instead believe that the books Ms.
Oliva allowed to be read were those books that she liked or those
with which she personally agreed."
This concern is intensified when it is combined with the above two
concerns. When especially young students are compelled to be at school
and many student speakers express the same view, it may be even more
likely that listening students misperceive that the speakers' expression
is sponsored by the school.
It is important to remember, however, that this perception of
school sponsorship is based on confusion and misunderstanding. The
erroneous perception of a young child, or anyone for that matter,
cannot transform speech that happens at school into speech that the
school promotes and stands behind. The perception would be
inaccurate and unreasonable.6" There is no reason to allow the
58. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271.
59. Oliva, 990 F. Supp. at 355. See also DeNooyer, 799 F. Supp. at 747 (defendants argued
"that second graders might not have the maturity to understand the context in which the
[Christian] song was presented, that the students might assume that the School District endorsed
the message of the song").
60. If not instructive or clarifying, it is at least interesting to note the Hazelwood Court's
ambiguity, in a mere four sentences, as to what constitutes "school-sponsored" student expression.
First, the Court says that it is not "a student's personal expression that happens to occur on the
school premises." Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271. Rather, it includes "expressive activities that
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subjective perception of one child (or of several children) to define the
scope of the constitutional right of another child.
Moreover, as previously noted, school officials, above all, are in
an extraordinary position to curb erroneous perception. Schools can
clarify for students what expression is or is not sponsored by the
school. Teachers can explain that a plurality of opinions and beliefs
exist in the world, especially in our country, and even in the classroom.
There is no reason for this fundamental lesson of civics not to take root
in the elementary school. Justice Brennan made this point sharply in
his dissent in Hazelwood:
The sole concomitant of school sponsorship that might conceivably
justify the distinction that the Court draws between sponsored and
nonsponsored student expression is the risk "that the views of the
individual speaker [might be] erroneously attributed to the school."
Of course, the risk of erroneous attribution inheres in any student
expression, including "personal expression" that, like the armbands
in Tinker, "happens to occur on the school premises." Nevertheless,
the majority is certainly correct that indicia of school sponsorship
increase the likelihood of such attribution, and that state educators
may therefore have a legitimate interest in dissociating themselves
from student speech.
But "[e]ven though the governmental purpose be legitimate
and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that
broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be
more narrowly achieved." Dissociative means short of censorship
are available to the school. It could, for example, require the
student activity to publish a disclaimer .... or it could simply issue
its own response clarifying the official position on the matter and
explaining why the student position is wrong.61
C. Age as an Independent Objection to Tinker
Even if a court were to conclude that the student speech at issue
occurred in something other than a nonpublic forum and that the
speech was not school-sponsored, there is an objection to applying the
Tinker standard in the elementary school context that is independent
of the concern that young children are more likely to misperceive
school sponsorship. The concern is that student speakers may
students, parents, and members of the public might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur
of the school." Id. Thus, it is only reasonable perception that can render expression "school-
sponsored." Yet, "[e]ducators are entitled to exercise greater control over [school-sponsored]
student expression to assure .. . that the views of the individual speaker are not erroneously
attributed to the school." Id.
61. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 288-89 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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emotionally harm student listeners.62 The court in Muller v. Jefferson
Lighthouse School expressed this concern in the midst of discussing
whether the student speech occurred in a public forum:
Declaring the elementary school classroom, hallway, or playground
forums for unfettered student communication would require either
a severe incursion into the critical educational mission of the
elementary school or a substantial contraction of the First Amend-
ment protections afforded speech in a public forum. Perhaps both.
But neither alteration is necessary on the facts before us. In a
public forum, the Christian can tell the Jew he is going to hell, or
the Jew can tell the Christian he is not one of God's chosen, no
matter how that may hurt. But it makes no sense to say that the
62. A variation on this theme is represented by Baxter v. Vigo County Sch. Corp., in which
an elementary school student alleged that she had a right under Tinker to wear confrontational T-
shirts (stating, e.g., "Unfair Grades," "Racism"). 26 F.3d 728, 730, 736 (7th Cir. 1994). The
court held that the school principal had qualified immunity. Id. at 738; see also Harless v. Darr,
937 F. Supp. 1339, 1350 (S.D. Ind. 1996) (finding school officials immune from constitutional
challenges to the officials' prohibiting elementary school student from passing out religious tracts
at school). The court based its reasoning upon the fact that the plaintiff "was at least seven years
younger than the youngest student in Tinker." Baxter, 26 F.3d at 738.
[G]iven the indications in [Bethel School District v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986),] and
[Hazelwood] that age is a relevant factor in assessing the extent of a student's free speech
rights in school, in addition to the dearth of caselaw in the lower federal courts, we are
unable to conclude that the Baxters have demonstrated that the right [the principal] is
alleged to have violated was "clearly established."
Id. Yet the court's analysis is confused. First, the court quoted the Fraser Court's statement that
"[ilt does not follow ... that simply because the use of an offensive form of expression may not
be prohibited to adults making what the speaker considers a political point, the same latitude must
be permitted to children in public school." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Bethel
Sch. Dist., 478 U.S. at 682). Yet, this is consistent with Tinker. While an adult may be allowed
a measure of offensiveness in his speech, Tinker curtails similar speech by a student when it
substantially disrupts the classroom.
Second, the Baxter court quoted the Hazelwood Court's statement that "a school must be able
to take into account the emotional maturity of the intended audience in determining whether to
disseminate student speech on potentially sensitive student topics." Baxter, 26 F.3d at 738
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 272). Yet the Hazelwood
Court was addressing the standard for regulating school-sponsored speech. The Baxter court offers
no analysis of how it perceived-or how the plaintiffs fellow students reasonably could have
perceived-the plaintiffs confrontational T-shirts to be sponsored by the school.
As the Baxter court alludes, some courts and commentators are concerned that young
students are not sufficiently mature to handle a broad freedom to speak. See Jay Alan Sekulow
et al., Proposed Guidelines for Student Religious Speech and Observance in Public Schools, 46
MERCER L. REv. 1017, 1072 (1995). Yet maturity is not a prerequisite to free speech protection.
Under the First Amendment, it is assumed initially that all Americans, even students, enjoy free
speech protection. "[N]othing in the [F]irst [A]mendment postpones the right of religious speech
until high school." Baxter, 26 F.3d at 738 (quoting Hedges v. Wauconda Community Sch. Dist.
No. 18, 9 F.3d 1295, 1298 (7th Cir. 1993)). This Article, and cases such as Tinker and
Hazelwood, wrestle with where to draw the lines of protection of student speech, based not on the
maturity of the speaker, but upon the competing rights of those whom the speaker affects.
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overly zealous Christian or Jewish child in an elementary school can
say the same thing to his classmate, no matter the impact. Racist
and other hateful views can be expressed in a public forum. But an
elementary school under its custodial responsibilities may restrict
such speech that could crush a child's sense of self-worth."
The court's conclusion controls its analysis. Finding that
classrooms are "forums for unfettered student communication" cannot
be right, the court says, because this "could crush a child's sense of
self-worth," a presupposed constitutional evil. Yet, as precious as a
child's self-worth is and as much as it should be protected, damage to
a child's self-worth is not necessarily equivalent to material and
substantial disruption of the educational environment. While the
Muller court concludes that it never makes sense to allow "the overly
zealous" child to tell another that he is going to hell (i.e., "no matter
the impact"), in Tinker the Supreme Court made clear that, for the
sake of the First Amendment, those within the schoolhouse may have
to experience some measure of "the discomfort and unpleasantness that
always accompany an unpopular viewpoint. "64
Still, one might assert that there is doctrinal support for valuing
a child's emotional health above another child's right to speak. For
example, while the courts protect symbolic speech under the First
Amendment, they do not protect violent acts that may very well also
be symbolic speech.65 Short of actual violence, "fighting words" are
not protected.66 Yet Tinker itself accounts for excessive intimidation
by student speakers. If one student's statement that another is going
to hell is part of an open and peaceful exchange, under Tinker, the
speech likely should be protected. If, however, the statement disrupts
the class, Tinker addresses the situation.
[T]he Tinker standard is flexible enough to account for the
differences in maturity between elementary school and older
children. Given their youth, it is more likely that unrestricted speech
in any given circumstances would be more likely to "substantially
disrupt" the school's normal operation where younger students are
involved. But this does not mean that school officials need not have
63. Muller v. Jefferson Lighthouse Sch., 98 F.3d 1530, 1539-40 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding
that a school district code requiring predistribution review and nonschool-endorsement disclaimer
on materials was constitutional).
64. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509.
65. See H.C. HUDGINS, JR. & RICHARD S. VACCA, LAW AND EDUCATION: CONTEMPO-
RARY ISSUES AND COURT DECISIONS 414-15 (4th ed. 1995).
66. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 927 (1982) (citing Chaplinsky v.
New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)).
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facts on which to base their fear of disruption before restricting
speech.67
D. Captive Audience Exception
Just as there is a concern about student age that is independent of
the concern about school sponsorship, there is an independent concern
about compulsory attendance. 68  The concern is that the listening
students may not want to hear the expression of student speakers.
Admittedly, part of maturing and learning social skills is encountering
people and expression that we either dislike or with which we disagree.
Yet one usual option for the "unreceptive listener" is to physically
distance oneself from the speaker or the speech. If it is an obnoxious
phone salesman, we can hang up the phone. If it is a disagreeable
pastor, we can leave the pew. If it is an aggressive protester, we can
walk away. When we do not have the option to remove ourselves from
speech coming our way, the courts have often held that the speech is
not protected by the First Amendment.69
In the classroom, students usually do not have an opportunity to
remove themselves from expression they dislike or with which they
disagree. Because they are compelled to be in the classroom, they must
endure whatever speech occurs there. Some may argue that this is
reason to apply a "captive audience" exception to free speech protec-
67. Sekulow, et al., supra note 62, at 1072. As of yet, there are no "decisions of the Courts
of Appeals applying Tinker-based speech right to the elementary school setting." Muller, 98 F.3d
at 1538. But see Johnston-Loehner v. O'Brien, 859 F. Supp. 575, 580-81 (M.D. Fla. 1994)
(applying Tinker where elementary school student challenged school district policy "requiring that
students obtain the review and approval of school officials prior to distributing any written
material").
Phillips v. Anderson County School District Five demonstrates how courts can apply Tinker
effectively. 987 F. Supp. 488 (D.S.C. 1997). In Phillips, a middle school student alleged that he
had a right to wear a jacket that looked like the Confederate battle flag. Id. at 490. The middle
school's student body was about three-fourths white and one-fourth black, and in the five years
prior to the time that school officials prohibited the plaintiff from wearing his jacket, the school
had experienced at least five incidents of violence or near violence caused by student display of
a Confederate flag. Id. The court concluded as a matter of law that school officials had a
reasonable basis for determining that the plaintiffs jacket would likely result in another substantial
disruption at the school. Id. at 493.
68. See supra Part II.B.1.
69. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 487 (1988) ("The First Amendment permits the
government to prohibit offensive speech as intrusive when the 'captive' audience cannot avoid the
objectionable speech."); Charles R. Lawrence III, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist
Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431, 456 ("Courts have held that offensive speech may not
be regulated in public forums such as streets and parks where a listener may avoid the speech by
moving on or averting his eyes, but the regulation of otherwise protected speech has been
permitted when the speech invades the privacy of the unwilling listener's home or when the
unwilling listener cannot avoid the speech.").
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tion in the classroom--one that allows schools great latitude in
regulating student speakers when they speak to unreceptive class-
mates.7' Looking at the listeners alone, and assuming that they are,
in fact, "unreceptive,"71 the argument seems persuasive.
Yet one cannot look at the listeners alone. Unlike the speakers in
the traditional "captive audience" cases, in the classroom, the speakers
are also compelled to be there.72 Whereas the phone salesman, the
pastor, and the protester have thousands of people to whom they can
express themselves, the student speaker, compelled to be in school six
to eight hours a day, does not have that option. If he is to express
himself at all during those six to eight hours, the student speaker will
have to do it in the classroom. Thus, the classroom is unlike virtually
any other place of expression: the listener has no escape and the
speaker has no other forum for expression. If one student wants to
speak and another does not want to hear it, one must budge.
Three reasons, taken together, justify the combination of applying
the Tinker standard and not applying a captive audience exception in
this context. First, the right to freedom of speech (or the right to have
the government not impede free speech) is specifically enumerated in
absolute terms. 73  Even if on a practical basis we cannot accept the
absolute nature of the Free Speech Clause,74 the absolute language
should carry weight.7 In contrast, the captive audience exception is
70. See Muller, 98 F.3d at 1541 ("Children in public schools are a captive audience that
school authorities acting in loco parentis may protect.") (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Bethel, 478 U.S. at 684); but cf. Seamons v. Snow, 84 F.3d 1226, 1236 (10th Cir. 1996)
(in discussing substantive due process: "Compulsory attendance laws for public schools, however,
do not create an affirmative constitutional duty to protect students from the private actions of
third parties while they attend school.").
71. This requirement could be the source of administrative difficulty. In captive audience
cases, the exception to free speech protection is based upon a finding that the listeners are not
receptive. Even if one accepts that the captive audience exception ought to apply in this context,
it does not necessarily follow that the school should be able to "apply" the exception without first
verifying that the listening students are unreceptive, as opposed to genuinely interested or, at least,
willing to listen.
72. See Sekulow, et al., supra note 62, at 1019.
73. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
74. Justice Black often attempted to stick to the absolutist sense of the text. But even
Justice Black found this approach unworkable. See, e.g., Tinker, 393 U.S. at 515 (Black, J.,
dissenting). See also John M. Beahn, Reno v. ACLU: The Communications Decency Act Hits a
Red Light on the Information Superhighway, 47 CATH. U. L. REv. 333, 333 (1997) ("Although the
language of the First Amendment appears absolute, the Supreme Court never has held the First
Amendment to confer an absolute right to free speech.").
75. Douglas Laycock, Notes on the Role of Judicial Review, the Expansion of Federal Power,
and the Structure of Constitutional Rights, 99 YALE L.J. 1711, 1745 (1990) (book review) ("The
proper standard for implied exceptions to absolute rights should be something like the compelling
interest test. An implied exception to a textually absolute right should be an extraordinary thing.
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a court-made adjustment to the Free Speech Clause.76 While the
exception makes sense where the speaker has other places for expres-
sion," no such leeway exists in the classroom. To accommodate the
unreceptive listener effectively would require placing the scope of the
student speaker's right to speak within the listener's discretion. Any
lack of receptivity by a fellow student would act as a prohibition of the
speaker's right to speak while at school-the captive audience would
be allowed the "heckler's veto." In this situation, it is reasonable that
the constitutional clause, rather than the exception, should prevail.
Second, unreceptive listeners have the tool of counterspeech.
Where this opportunity exists, counterspeech, rather than prohibition
of the original speech, is the better option.7" Unreceptive listeners
can employ counterspeech to protect themselves, to defend truth, and
to dilute speech with which they disagree. In contrast, if the captive
audience exception were applied, student speakers would be left with
no comparable tool to balance the situation. They would have to
dilute their speech enough to not elicit an "unreceptive" response from
a fellow student.
Third, the Tinker standard itself mitigates unfairness to unrecep-
tive listeners. It is likely that in situations in which listeners will be
genuinely unreceptive (e.g., where the speech is unusually loud or
aggressive), the speech in question will be substantially disruptive,
especially in an elementary school classroom. 9 If regular listeners
We have learned from experience that 'no law' cannot literally mean no law. But 'no law' should
mean hardly any law-as few laws as possible.").
76. Arguably, it is merely the proper interpretation of what the Free Speech Clause actually
means.
77. See, e.g., Frisby, 487 U.S. at 484-87 (finding that city ordinance limiting speech served
narrowly tailored government interest and that captive audience exception was applicable where
"ordinance permits the more general dissemination of a message" and "preserves ample alternative
channels of communication"). Additionally, the captive audience exception is more favored when
the unwanted speech invades the listener's home, "the last citadel of the tired, the weary, and the
sick." Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 775 (1994) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Frisby, 487 U.S. at 484).
78. See, e.g., Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 672 (1994) ("Under the First Amendment
there is no such thing as a false idea, the fitting remedy for evil counsels is good ones." (internal
quotation marks omitted) (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974));
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)); Washington v. Vote
No! Comm., 135 Wash. 2d 618, 626, 957 P.2d 691, 696 (1998) ("Instead of relying on the State
to silence false political speech, the First Amendment requires our dependence on even more
speech to bring forth truth.") (citations omitted).
79. See Sekulow, et al., supra note 62, at 1072.
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(i.e., outside the school setting) had the protection Tinker affords, the
captive audience exception would be less needed.8"
Some may argue that counterspeech will be of no help in the
hands of elementary school children-they are too young to effectively
counter another's speech."1 But surely one youngster can effectively
counter the speech of another youngster. On average, both will be
equally youthfully inarticulate, disorganized, and rambling. Some may
also argue that counterspeech will be ineffective where there is a large
aggregate number of same-viewpoint speakers. While this is worthy
of concern, counterspeech from a lone dissenter can be effective. In
particular, if several speakers share the same viewpoint, the veracity of
their claims can be dealt with singularly. It is only one viewpoint that
must be opposed. The real discomfort here is the intimidation that the
lone dissenter might face. Tinker will curb part of that intimidation.
Any intimidation that exists beyond the scope of the Tinker standard
is part of the cost of the Free Speech Clause.82
E. Applying Tinker to Oliva
One might ask whether applying Tinker, instead of Hazelwood,
would actually make a difference. Would the Tinker standard allow for
greater student religious speech within the classroom? On the doctrinal
level, the answer is yes. 3 Under Tinker, school officials can prohibit
student speech only when they "forecast substantial disruption of or
material interference with school activities" or an "invasion of the
rights of others."8 4 Under Hazelwood, "[i]t is only when the decision
to censor a school-sponsored publication, theatrical production, or
other vehicle of student expression has no valid educational purpose
that the First Amendment is so 'directly and sharply implicate[d],' as
80. See Frisby, 487 U.S. at 486 ("The type of picketers banned by the [city] ordinance
generally do not seek to disseminate a message to the general public, but to intrude upon the
targeted resident, and to do so in an especially offensive way. Moreover, even if some such
picketers have a broader communicative purpose, their activity nonetheless inherently and
offensively intrudes on residential privacy. The devastating effect of targeted picketing on the
quiet enjoyment of the home is beyond doubt.").
81. See, e.g., Muller, 98 F.3d at 1538 ("The 'marketplace of ideas,' an important theme in
the high school student expression cases, is a less appropriate description of an elementary school,
where children are just beginning to acquire the means of expression.").
82. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
83. The words "allow for" are important here. The argument here is not that if courts
apply Tinker to student speech in the classroom a greater quantum of student religious speech will
result. Rather, it is that the First Amendment protects an individual's right to speak, if he so
chooses, and that Tinker better protects that choice.
84. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513-14.
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to require judicial intervention to protect students' constitutional
rights.""s
In review, Oliva also demonstrates the effect of Tinker. The first
decision to be made is whether Tinker or Hazelwood applies. If the
student speech occurs in a nonpublic forum and is sponsored by the
school, Hazelwood applies. If not, Tinker applies. The Oliva court
quoted the Hazelwood statement that "school facilities may be deemed
to be public forums only if school authorities have 'by policy or by
practice' opened those facilities 'for indiscriminate use by the general
public,' or by some segment of the public, such as student organiza-
tions."" The court then summarily concluded that "[iut is clear that
Z.H.'s school and classroom were not public forums."87  The only
support the court relied upon was "the fact that Z.H.'s teacher reserved
the right to inspect and reject each child's reading selection before it
was presented to the class."88
'The court's reasoning is flawed. There is, in fact, no elementary
school classroom that is open for "indiscriminate use by the general
public." Where the issue is whether a member of the public has a
right to speak in the school, this fact is important. In cases such as
Oliva, however, the issue is the degree of freedom a student has to
speak. As discussed above, when a person is in a place he is enti-
tled-or compelled-to be, as to that person, the place cannot reason-
ably be considered a "closed forum."89
Even if student expression occurs in a nonpublic forum, as the
Oliva court concluded, the expression still must be school-sponsored
in order for Hazelwood to apply. Yet the Oliva court gave no
consideration to the issue of school sponsorship before applying the
Hazelwood standard.90 While later in the opinion, the court did
discuss potential misperception by Z.H.'s classmates, 91 the court
offered no explanation of why this perception would be reasonable or
why Ms. Oliva, in Justice Brennan's words, could not have employed
the "[d]issociative means short of censorship [that were] available to
the school."92
85. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273 (citation omitted).
86. Oliva, 990 F. Supp. at 352 n.16 (quoting Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 267).
87. Id. at 352 n.16.
88. Id.
89. See supra Part II.A.
90. See Oliva, 990 F. Supp. at 352-53.
91. See supra Part II.B.3.
92. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 289 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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Assuming that the Oliva court should have applied Tinker, what
would be the result of doing so? According to the court, "because of
its religious content, Ms. Oliva did not allow Z.H. to read the story to
his class."93  Is this reason sufficient under Tinker? One can argue
that issues of religion often profoundly divide people, and that it is
likely that a religious story would offend another student to the extent
that classroom activities could be substantially disrupted. Yet the
Tinker Court stated that
[i]n order for .. .school officials to justify prohibition of a particu-
lar expression of opinion, [they] must be able to show that [their
actions were] caused by something more than a mere desire to avoid
the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an
unpopular viewpoint. Certainly where there is no finding and no
showing that engaging in the forbidden conduct would "materially
and substantially interfere with the requirements of appropriate
discipline in the operation of the school," the prohibition cannot be
sustained.94
Ms. Oliva made no determination that Z.H.'s speech would cause
a material or substantial disruption. Rather, "Z.H. was not allowed to
read the book to his classmates during class time because it was The
Bible, a religious book that constitutes the very foundation for a
number of, but obviously not all, religions."" Ms. Oliva banned
Z.H.'s speech to avoid the discomfort that accompanies a potentially
divisive viewpoint-an impermissible act according to the Supreme
Court in Tinker.96
93. Oliva, 990 F. Supp. at 347.
94. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509 (citation omitted). The Court further proclaimed that
undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough to overcome the right
to freedom of expression. Any departure from absolute regimentation may cause
trouble. Any variation from the majority's opinion may inspire fear. Any word spoken,
in class, in the lunchroom, or on the campus, that deviates from the views of another
person may start an argument or cause a disturbance. But our Constitution says we
must take this risk.
Id. at 508. See also Hsu v. Roslyn Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 3, 85 F.3d 839, 872 (2d Cir. 1996)
("[Alllowing the Walking on Water Club to guarantee that three of its prayer leaders will be
Christians does not constitute 'substantial and material interference' with the School's mission of
educating and disciplining.").
95. Oliva, 990 F. Supp. at 354.
96. This is not to mention that banning the Bible, or religious books generally, from the
reading program was likely viewpoint discrimination, itself a violation of the Constitution. See
Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829.
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III. THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
During the discussion of the Free Speech Clause, undoubtedly
many readers waited for the other shoe to drop. Even if Tinker should
apply in cases such as Oliva, and student speech such as Z.H.'s should
be protected under Tinker, one must still take account of the Establish-
ment Clause.
Courts and commentators agree that the Establishment Clause
restricts government action.97 Thus, for example, if Microsoft began
including in Windows 98 a screen saver that displays Bible verses,
many of the computer users "compelled" to use Windows 98 might
not like the screen saver, but they would have no Establishment Clause
claim based on the inclusion of the Bible verses. The Establishment
Clause cannot reach Microsoft's expression because the expression is
private and not "of' the government. In order for the Establishment
Clause to apply to a situation, it must be one in which the government
acts.
The difficulty in the context of religious expression in the
classroom is deciding when the expression is, in fact, private and when
it is of the government. The Establishment Clause does not reach the
former; it greatly limits the latter. When a teacher or school official
speaks about religion or in a religious mode (e.g., prayer), the
Establishment Clause clearly is at issue because the government,
through its agent, has spoken. Then the question for the court
becomes whether this government speech constitutes an "establish-
ment"-i.e., whether the Clause is violated. Since it is obvious that
applying one of the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause tests9" is
the task at hand, a court need not go through the mental exercise,
much less the written exercise, of noting that the government has
acted.
How should courts assess the constitutionality of religious
expression by a student? Like Microsoft's expression, the student
expression is made by a private citizen, not a government agent.
Nevertheless, some courts reason that if the school permits student
religious speech, that act of permission may violate the Establishment
Clause.99 In assessing the validity of this approach, it is useful to
97. See Pinette, 515 U.S. at 766 (plurality); id. at 779 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
98. See Ingebretsen v. Jackson Pub. Sch. Dist., 88 F.3d 274, 278-79 (5th Cir. 1996), cert.
denied, 117 S. Ct. 388 (1996) ("The Fifth Circuit has identified three tests that the Supreme Court
has used to determine whether a government action or policy constitutes an establishment of
religion": the Lemon, coercion, and endorsement tests).
99. See, e.g., Oliva, 990 F. Supp. at 353 (discussing "endorsement" concerns).
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first take note of both the text of the First Amendment and how the
framers of the Constitution viewed religious liberty.
A. The First Amendment Text
The First Amendment states: "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech .. ."10 The first
relevant observation is that the text states, "Congress shall make no
law." While the Supreme Court long ago decided that the Fourteenth
Amendment makes the First Amendment equally effective upon state
governments, 0 1 it is important to remember that it is government
action with which the amendment is concerned.
Second, the First Amendment does not designate any priority
among the Establishment, Free Exercise, and Free Speech Clauses. As
a purely textual matter, each clause has equal weight and it is
reasonable that each clause has a function independent from the other
First Amendment clauses.
Third, the First Amendment text does not indicate what the term
"speech" encompasses. However, it is clear that "speech" includes
religious speech. Speech does not lose the protection of the Free
Speech Clause because the speech is religious. "2 Moreover, because
the First Amendment text directs that Congress shall make no law
prohibiting the free exercise of religion, speech that is part of the free
exercise of religion is twice protected, once by the Free Speech Clause
and once by the Free Exercise Clause. 1°3
Fourth, as with the word "speech," the text does not clarify the
meaning of "establishment." "Establishment" often connotes
something permanent or institutionalized, 10 4 and some have argued
that the Establishment Clause prohibits only founding a national
religion or preferring one religious sect over another.' Others have
100. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
101. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
102. Pinette, 515 U.S. at 760 ("a free-speech clause without religion would be Hamlet
without the prince").
103. Douglas Laycock, Freedom of Speech That Is Both Religious and Political, 29 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 793, 796 (1996); see also supra note 9.
104. See WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 778 (1986).
105. Chief Justice Rehnquist has asserted that
[i]f one were to .. .construe the [First] [A]mendment in the light of what particular
"practices ... threaten those consequences which the Framers deeply feared; whether,
in short, they tend to promote that type of interdependence between religion and state
which the First Amendment was designed to prevent," one would have to say that the
First Amendment Establishment Clause should be read no more broadly than to prevent
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argued that the Clause forbids any law that even tends toward an
"establishment."1 0 6
B. The Framers' View of Religious Speech
"Religious speech is central to the First Amendment because
religion is central to the First Amendment."10 7  The framers made
religion central to the First Amendment because of their considered
commitment to religious liberty.'0 8 This commitment grew out of
three primary realizations. First, government attempts to suppress
unpopular religious views had caused vast suffering in Europe and,
though to a lesser degree, in the colonies.'0 9 Second, religious beliefs
are of unparalleled importance to the individual. Thus, it is best to
leave religion in the hands of those who care about it most: individu-
als themselves."' Third, religious beliefs ultimately are of little
the establishment of a national religion or the governmental preference of one religious
sect over another.
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 100 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting Abington Sch.
Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 236 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring)).
106. In refuting Chief Justice Rehnquist's view, Justice Souter has asserted that "[t]he
Framers repeatedly considered and deliberately rejected such narrow language and instead
extended their prohibition to state support for 'religion' in general." Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S.
577, 614 (1992) (Souter, J., concurring).
Some commentators have suggested that by targeting laws respecting "an" establishment
of religion, the Framers adopted the very nonpreferentialist position whose much clearer
articulation they repeatedly rejected. Yet the indefinite article before the word
"establishment" is better seen as evidence that the Clause forbids any kind of establish-
ment, including a nonpreferential one. If the Framers had wished, for some reason, to
use the indefinite term to achieve a narrow meaning for the Clause, they could far more
aptly have placed it before the word "religion."
Id. at 615 (citations omitted). See also Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100
YALE L.J. 1131, 1157 (1991).
How one answers the question of what the Establishment Clause prohibits does not alter the
first two of the above observations: the First Amendment restricts government action and it gives
no priority to any one of its clauses. However, one's answer may very well affect the third
observation: the First Amendment protects religious speech. If the Establishment Clause
prohibits only some sort of national religion or preference among sects, religious speech may not
be very problematic. For example, Z.H.'s speech alone, even if promoted by his teacher, would
not nationalize religion. On the other hand, if the Establishment Clause requires the government
to be neutral toward religion-to neither encourage nor discourage religion-religious speech, if
promoted by the government, is problematic.
107. Laycock, supra note 103, at 797.
108. See Laycock, supra note 9.
109. Id.; see also Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 432 (1962) ("[A] purpose of the
Establishment Clause rested upon an awareness of the historical fact that governmentally
established religions and religious persecutions go hand in hand.").
110. Laycock, supra note 9, at 317; see also Engel, 370 U.S. at 432 ("The Establishment
Clause thus stands as an expression of principle on the part of the Founders of our Constitution
that religion is too personal, too sacred, too holy, to permit its 'unhallowed perversion' by a civil
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importance to civil government-problems due to lack of national
religious uniformity pale in comparison to those that arise from
attempts to impose such uniformity."' Because of their commitment
to religious liberty, the framers believed that to the extent that any
class of speech is worth protecting, religious speech is clearly within
that class.
In light of the framers' high valuation of religious speech because
of its religious content, the framers would have contradicted themselves
if they had restricted it more than other sorts of high-value speech
because of religious speech's nonsecular content. That is, if religious
speech is highly valuable, it may be as restricted as other high-value
speech, but not for the very reason for which it is thought valuable.
Moreover, if the framers sought to protect religious liberty in order to
avoid the suffering that usually attends the government imposition of
religious uniformity, it would be counterproductive to allow less
religious speech than other high-value speech. Likewise, because the
framers thought that religion matters most to individuals and that it is
not worthwhile for government to impose religious uniformity, it
would not make sense to write an amendment that first doubly protects
religious speech-through the Free Exercise and Free Speech Claus-
es-but then simultaneously voids the right to engage in that speech.
C. Distinguishing Private Speech from Government Speech
1. Recent Cases
The Supreme Court's most recent effort to distinguish private and
government expression under the Establishment Clause is Capitol
Square Review & Advisory Board v. Pinette.112 In Pinette, the review
board charged with regulating public access to the plaza surrounding
the Statehouse in Columbus, Ohio, denied an application by the Ku
Klux Klan to place an unattended cross in the plaza for two weeks
during the Christmas holidays.' Looking to the Free Speech
Clause, a majority of the Court found that when the KKK applied to
erect the cross, it sought to engage in "constitutionally protected
expression" and that the Statehouse plaza was a "full-fledged public
forum.""' 4 The majority began its analysis by stating bluntly that
magistrate.").
111. See Laycock, supra note 9, at 317.
112. 515 U.S. 753 (1995).
113. Id. at 758.
114. Id. at 761.
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the KKK's religious display was "private expression,""11 but it did
not explain how it reached this conclusion. The Court did explain that
it viewed the case before it as being like Lamb's Chapel v. Center for
Moriches Union Free School District"' and Widmar v. Vincent,
117
in that in all three cases "[t]he State did not sponsor [the speaker's]
expression.""' 8 A plurality in Pinette refused to apply any Establish-
ment Clause test to the KKK's challenged speech, finding neither
"expression by the government itself," nor "government action alleged
to discriminate in favor of private religious expression or activity. '
There are two primary differences between Pinette and Oliva.
First, the speech in Oliva was a book rather than a symbol. Second,
the location of the speech in Oliva was a public school classroom rather
than state capitol grounds. The first distinction is of little conse-
quence. There is no indication in Pinette that the Court's analysis
would have differed significantly had the form of speech been
different. 2 ° The second distinction matters. One might argue that
allowing Z.H. to read his story would violate the Establishment Clause
because those who would have received the speech were a captive
audience-students forced to attend school; whereas in Pinette, those
who saw the cross were free to come and go from the capitol grounds.
In Lee v. Weisman, the Supreme Court considered a public high
school student's challenge to a school district policy that allowed
principals to invite clergy to offer prayers at middle school and high
school graduations. 2' The Court held that a religious exercise may
not be "conducted at a graduation ceremony where, as we have found,
young graduates who object are induced to conform."' 22  The
Court's holding was controlled, in part, by a finding of compulsory
attendance: "Even for those students who object to the religious
exercise, their attendance and participation in the state-sponsored
115. Id. at 760.
116. 508 U.S. at 384 (holding that school district violated church members' Free Speech
rights by denying church access to district's facilities based solely on viewpoint church wished to
present).
117. 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (holding that public university violated Free Speech Clause by
excluding student religious group from facilities open to other student groups).
118. Pinette, 515 U.S. at 763.
119. Id. at 764.
120. See id. at 786 (Souter, J., concurring) ("When an individual speaks in a public forum,
it is reasonable for an observer to attribute the speech, first and foremost, to the speaker, while
an unattended display (and any message it conveys) can naturally be viewed as belonging to the
owner of the land on which it stands.").
121. 505 U.S. at 581.
122. Id. at 599.
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religious activity are in a fair and real sense obligatory."' 3  The
Court's holding was equally dependent upon its finding that
[s]tate officials direct[ed] the performance of a formal religious
exercise... The government involvement with religious activity in
this case is pervasive, to the point of creating a state-sponsored and
state-directed religious exercise in a public school. . . . [F]rom a
constitutional perspective it is as if a state statute decreed that the
prayers must occur'
t24
The pervasive government involvement stemmed from the fact that the
school principal "decided that an invocation and a benediction should
be given" and "chose the religious participant"; both choices were
"attributable to the State."'2 5
Four years after Lee, in Ingebretsen v. Jackson Public School
District, the Fifth Circuit considered an appeal from a district court's
decision to enjoin enforcement of Mississippi's School Prayer Statute,
which allowed prayer at compulsory and noncompulsory school
events."6 Similar to the Lee Court's finding of extensive government
involvement, the Ingebretsen court found that "[t]he statute will
inevitably involve school officials in determining which prayers are
'nonsectarian and nonproselytizing' and in determining who gets to say
the prayer at each event."' 27  The court also noted more than once
that "students will be a captive audience that cannot leave without
being punished by the state or School Board for truancy or excessive
absences."' 28
In contrast to Pinette, where the plurality did not even apply one
of the Establishment Clause tests, the courts in Lee and Ingebretsen
tested for, and found, an Establishment Clause violation. How is this
contrast reconciled? One possible answer is that Lee and Ingebretsen
123. Id. at 586.
124. Id. at 586-87.
125. Id. at 587. See also American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey v. Black Horse Pike
Regional Bd. of Educ., 84 F.3d 1471 (3d Cir. 1996) (en banc) (student-initiated prayer at
graduation violates the Establishment Clause).
126. 88 F.3d 274, 277 (5th Cir. 1996). Specifically, "[tjhe district court enjoined
enforcement of the statute in its entirety with the exception of the portion which permits prayers
to take place at graduation ceremonies in accordance with Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist.,
977 F.2d 963, 972 (5th Cir. 1992) (Jones II)." Id. at 278.
The statute at issue read in part: "[Ilnvocations, benedictions or nonsectarian, nonproselytiz-
ing student-initiated prayer shall be permitted during compulsory or noncompulsory school-
related student assemblies, student sporting events, graduation or commencement ceremonies and
other school-related events." Id. at 277.
127. Id. at 279.
128. Id. at 279-80.
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involved public schools, while Pinette did not. Yet, presumably, adults
and children in the general public (i.e., those who might see the cross
in Pinette) are equally as protected as students in public schools. More
accurately, whatever "establishment" the Establishment Clause
prohibits, the Clause applies equally in and out of the public schools.
But the school/nonschool answer does strike near another more
plausible answer: Lee and Ingebretsen involved captive audiences, while
Pinette did not. The Pinette plurality did not refer to the lack of a
captive audience. Rather the plurality stated that "[r]eligious
expression cannot violate the Establishment Clause where it (1) is
purely private and (2) occurs in a traditional or designated public
forum, announced and open to all on equal terms."' 29
However, this does not mean that the captive audience answer is
without merit. Perhaps the Pinette Court would have engaged the
Establishment Clause had the case involved a captive audience. It is
hard to imagine how a captive audience could have existed in Pinette,
given the open nature of the state capitol grounds upon which the
religious expression occurred. But, for illustration, we might vary the
Pinette facts. First, suppose that the religious expression consisted of
a group of "speakers" with hand-held crosses rather than a large, free-
standing cross. With this variation, the Pinette holding should remain
the same: the government merely "watches on," but neither speaks
itself nor discriminates in favor of the speech. Second, suppose further
that the capitol grounds were extremely crowded (e.g., on the Fourth
of July) and that because of the extreme crowd many of the people
"receiving" the religious expression were effectively unable to distance
themselves from the expression. Now a captive audience might exist.
Does the Pinette holding change? If it does change-if the Establish-
ment Clause is now at issue something more fundamental has also
changed: the government has become a speaker or a promoter of the
speech.
Thus, we should ask whether the existence of a captive audience
transforms what would otherwise be private expression into govern-
ment expression. In our present Pinette example, it is arguable that the
speakers have less protection for their speech in the face of a captive
audience. 3 ' Yet the government (the review board) acts no more
129. Pinette, 515 U.S. at 770. As to the students compelled to be there, classrooms cannot
be considered nonpublic fora. See supra Part II.E. Rather, as to those students, the classrooms
are "open to all on equal terms." If a classroom were not open to all on equal terms-e.g., if
Z.H.'s teacher allowed Z.H. to command the class's attention, but allowed no other student to do
the same-the Establishment Clause would clearly be at issue.
130. See supra Part II.D.
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when the audience is captive than it does when the audience is not
captive. Captive audience or not, the review board merely holds open
the plaza for public use, accepts applications by public users, and
processes those applications based upon criteria such as safety and
sanitation. 3' With no further government action in our captive
audience version of Pinette than in the actual Pinette case, there is no
reason to test for an Establishment Clause violation in our example
when the plurality did not do so in Pinette. Captive audience does not
mean government expression.
2. Government-Created Captive Audience?
Many will argue, however, that the above example differs greatly
from cases such as Oliva, because in the latter cases the government
itself creates the captive audience via compelled classroom attendance.
Where the government makes an audience captive by force of law, the
argument goes, religious speech directed at that audience implicates the
Establishment Clause. Yet in most cases like Oliva, the party claiming
an Establishment Clause violation does not challenge the government's
compulsory attendance law. Rather, the party takes compulsory
attendance as a given and challenges the school's allowance of religious
speech or conduct within the classroom. 13 2
Because the Establishment Clause is implicated only if the
government acts, we should ask whether compulsory attendance is
sufficient to make religious expression in the classroom "attributable
to the State."' 33  This question is similar to one addressed above in
the discussion of the Free Speech Clause: Does compulsory attendance
in the classroom create per se school sponsorship of whatever speech
occurs there?134  In that context, the answer is no; compelled class-
131. See Pinette, 515 U.S. at 757-58.
132. See, e.g., Oliva, 990 F. Supp. at 353 (discussing "endorsement" concerns).
133. Lee, 505 U.S. at 587.
134. See supra Part II.B.1. The difference between the two questions is this: Under the
Free Speech Clause, we ask whether compulsory attendance allows school officials the discretion
to censor student speech for any valid educational purpose (see Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273), as
opposed to regulating the speech only when the officials forecast that the speech will substantially
disrupt or materially interfere with school activities or invade the rights of others (see Tinker, 393
U.S. at 513-14). Under the Establishment Clause, we ask whether compulsory attendance requires
school officials to censor student speech that is religious.
In the Free Speech discussion, the question was also asked whether the fact that a listener
is "unreceptive" should create an exception to speech protection in the classroom. See supra Part
lI.D. The answer is no. Of course, regarding the hypothetical drawn from Pinette (not a
classroom setting), the traditional captive audience exception might well apply. That is, a court
might not reach the Establishment Clause because it decides that the speakers' protection is
limited when speaking to the unreceptive listeners.
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room attendance does not necessarily mean school sponsorship. The
reasoning for this answer is based, in part, on the Supreme Court's
recognition in Hazelwood that some student expression merely
"happens to occur" in the classroom, as opposed to being sponsored by
the school."'
While the Hazelwood Court made its assertions in the context of
the Free Speech Clause, it is reasonable that the Court's analysis
should also apply in the Establishment Clause context. That is,
despite compulsory attendance, there is at least some student speech in
the classroom not attributable to the government-speech that should
not implicate the Establishment Clause. However, one might argue
that while compulsory attendance should not be enough to create
"government sponsorship" in the Free Speech context, it should be
enough under the Establishment Clause. There are at least two
rationales for this argument.
a. A Broad Reading of the Establishment Clause
The first rationale is that the Establishment Clause is concerned
with any tendency toward an establishment of religion, and when the
government compels classroom attendance and then allows religious
speech or conduct there, an establishment of religion is begun. This
justification is flawed. Even if the Establishment Clause prohibits the
slightest move toward establishing religion, we are still left with the
difficulty of determining the meaning of "establishment." The
solution under the present rationale would be simply to prohibit
religious speech and conduct in the classroom. That is, although we
are not sure what an establishment of religion looks like, we can
probably avoid it through categorical prophylactic measures. Yet, in
contrast to the uncertainty regarding "establishment," we do know that
religious speech and conduct are valued under our Constitution.
136
It is inconsistent with the Constitution to root out any trace of religion.
b. Maximum Liberty
One might also assert that finding "government sponsorship"
under the Establishment Clause based solely on compulsory attendance
(and not doing so under the Free Speech Clause) is consistent with
maximizing individual liberty. That is, while finding government
135. See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 270-71. It is noteworthy that this recognition is secondary
to the recognition that there is, in fact, private student expression in the school setting, as opposed
to only government-sponsored student expression.
136. See supra parts III.A-B.
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sponsorship under the Free Speech Clause means less protection for the
student speaker, finding government sponsorship under the Establish-
ment Clause means more protection for all students against the State
getting into the religion business. Yet the latter would maximize
liberty in only one scenario: if it were agreed that religious speech and
conduct are oppressive and undesirable. Even if finding government
sponsorship based upon compulsory attendance basically eradicated
religion in the classroom, this outcome is justified because courts
would be protecting citizens against a bad thing. But it is far from
agreed that religion is undesirable. To the contrary, the framers in the
1790s and the federal courts in the years since have accorded religion
high priority. Indeed, the Constitution protects religious practice via
the Free Exercise Clause and the Free Speech Clause. The effect of
"easily" finding government sponsorship is to transform the Establish-
ment Clause's function from preventing the establishment of religion
to that of prohibiting religion.
c. Government Action Required
To find that the government acts when student speech occurs in
a classroom in which the government has compelled attendance
misassigns responsibility for the speech. When the government
compels attendance, it clearly acts. This action, like any government
action, should be subject to Establishment Clause scrutiny. Yet the
fact that the government acts by compelling attendance does not mean
that no student speaks unless prompted by the government. Even
though the government compels attendance in the classroom, it does
not have control over all that is spoken there.137 Nor should it be
"charged" with control over all that is spoken there. The effect of
charging the government with this control would be to make any
religious speech occurring in the classroom subject to the full force of
the Establishment Clause. Students would have no more right to
religious speech than a government agent (e.g., the class teacher) would
have. In effect, the classroom would be a "religion-free" zone. The
classroom, where our public school children spend the better part of
the day for 170 days a year, would become a place from which religion
is banished instead of a place where religion is cherished. This result
would contradict the framers' belief that religious discourse is valuable
137. For example, teachers often place broad requirements on the type of expression
required to fulfill an assignment. See, e.g., Oliva, 990 F. Supp. at 346 (teacher allowed students
"to read a book of their own choosing to the rest of the class").
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and it would prioritize the Establishment Clause above the Free Speech
Clause, despite the lack of textual support for this priority.
This result is additionally problematic because it contradicts one
of the framers' core intents for the Establishment Clause: preventing
the imposition of uniformity in religious belief. The Clause should
protect students and others from the government deciding the most
important issues in life. As a corollary, it should not preempt citizens'
independent ability to prevent the government from deciding these
issues. That is, the Clause should not silence speakers who counter the
government's position on what the speakers believe to be issues of vital
importance. 3  Yet this is what happens when a court calls student
speech in a compulsory attendance classroom "government action." By
being assigned responsibility for student religious speech-which is
then restricted by the Establishment Clause-the government silences
religious speakers. There must be student religious expression in the
classroom that is private, neither the product of government action nor
sponsored by the government.
This conclusion is consistent with both Lee and Ingebretsen.
While each court found an Establishment Clause violation where
attendance was compelled, each court's holding also depended upon the
conclusion that the religious speech was "state-sponsored" and "state-
directed." '139 In Lee, this result was due to the finding that a govern-
ment agent, the school principal, decided that prayers should be given
and then chose who should give those prayers.14 This government
action was equivalent to a statute prescribing prayer.1 ' In Ingebret-
sen, the government-sponsorship stemmed from the inevitability of
school officials having both to distinguish sectarian and nonsectarian
prayers and to choose who would pray."' If either court had consid-
ered compulsory attendance alone sufficient to create government
sponsorship, then once the court noted the compulsory attendance, it
could have foregone further reasoning as to why it found government
sponsorship.
138. See Sekulow, et al., supra note 62, at 1020 ("To deny students the right to express
views contrary to those the state wishes to impose would turn the public schools into
indoctrination centers in which students would be force-fed only that which the state wanted them
to hear. School officials, in effect, would be prescribing orthodoxy.").
139. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 586-87; Ingebretson, 88 F.3d at 279.
140. Lee, 505 U.S. at 587.
141. Id. at 586-87.
142. Ingebretsen, 88 F.3d at 279.
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D. The Endorsement Test
Some disagree with the assertion that the Establishment Clause
should not even be an issue in cases involving student religious speech
in the classroom. They argue that if the government has not acted
problematically, applying the Establishment Clause will reveal this
truth. In Pinette, four Justices chose to forego Establishment Clause
analysis.' Four of the other five Justices applied a version of the
"endorsement test.' 1 44  Justice O'Connor, joined by Justices Breyer
and Souter, asserted that "the endorsement test asks the right question
... even where a neutral state policy toward private religious speech
in a public forum is at issue," and found no constitutional viola-
tion. 145  Justices Ginsburg and Stevens did find a violation.'46
Under the endorsement test, "[e]very government practice must be
judged in its unique circumstances to determine whether it constitutes
an endorsement or disapproval of religion. '147  At first blush, it may
seem that this test addresses what this Article wrestles with in Part III:
whether the government "acts" when it allows student religious
expression in the classroom. Yet the endorsement test is an unaccept-
able test to apply to speech such as Z.H.'s.
In Pinette, Justice O'Connor emphasized that she is unlikely "to
come to a different result from the plurality where truly private speech
is allowed on equal terms in a vigorous public forum that the
government has administered properly."' 14' Her disagreement with
the plurality resulted from her belief "that an impermissible message
of endorsement can be sent in a variety of contexts, not all of which
involve direct government speech or outright favoritism.' 1 49 For
example, Justice O'Connor noted, the distinction between government
speech endorsing religion and private speech endorsing religion made
143. Pinette, 515 U.S. at 753 (Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy, Scalia, and
Thomas).
144. See id. at 772 (O'Connor, J., concurring, joined by Souter & Breyer, JJ.) (applying
endorsement test); id. at 783 (Souter, J., concurring, joined by O'Connor & Breyer, JJ.) (same);
id. at 799 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (same). Justice Ginsburg based her brief opinion on the
assumption that "the aim of the Establishment Clause is genuinely to uncouple government from
church." Id. at 817 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16
(1947)).
145. Pinette, 515 U.S. at 772 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
146. Id. at 797 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 817 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
147. County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter,
492 U.S. 573, 624-25 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
148. Pinette, 515 U.S. at 775 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
149. Id. at 774.
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by the plurality in Board of Education of Westside Community Schools
v. Mergens"'5 was dependent, in part, upon concluding that "second-
ary school students are mature enough and are likely to understand
that a school does not endorse or support student speech that it merely
permits on a nondiscriminatory basis." '  Justice Souter made the
same point, noting that in Widmar v. Vincent,"5 2 "[i]t was relevant
that university students 'should be able to appreciate that the Universi-
ty's policy is one of neutrality toward religion,' that students were
unlikely, as a matter of fact, to 'draw any reasonable inference of
University support from the mere fact of a campus meeting
place."" 53 Thus, Justices O'Connor and Souter indicated that where
school students do not understand that their school does not support
student religious speech, but merely permits it on a nondiscriminatory
basis, the Establishment Clause imposes upon the government an
affirmative obligation "to take steps to avoid being perceived as
supporting or endorsing a private religious message." '54
Assuming that in Oliva-like cases the elementary school students
do not understand that their school does not endorse the private
religious message, what "steps" can school officials take to adhere to
the endorsement test interpretation of the Establishment Clause? One
option would be for schools to refrain from compelling classroom
attendance either altogether or during periods of private religious
expression. This option, however, surely would be unpopular and
would raise a number of administrative difficulties. A second option
is for the class teacher to censor the private religious message.
Does the Establishment Clause mandate censoring students?
Justice O'Connor's and Justice Souter's concurrences in Pinette are not
decisive on this point, but they seem to indicate that (1) if students
misperceive endorsement, 5 and (2) no other options exist, the
Establishment Clause imposes an "affirmative obligation" to avoid the
misperception.5 6 This result is unfortunate, one might argue, but it
150. 496 U.S. 226 (1990) (holding that the Equal Access Act does not violate the
Establishment Clause).
151. Pinette, 515 U.S. at 774-75 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Mergens, 496
U.S. at 250 (plurality)); see also id. at 788 (Souter, J., concurring) (quoting same passage from
Mergens).
152. 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (holding that public university violated Free Speech Clause by
excluding student religious group from facilities open to other student groups).
153. Pinette, 515 U.S. at 791 (Souter, J., concurring) (quoting Widmar, 454 U.S. at 274
n.14).
154. Id. at 777 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
155. See supra notes 148-54 and accompanying text.
156. Pinette, 515 U.S. at 777 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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is, especially in the context of the elementary school classroom, merely
a part of the price that must be paid for a constitutional guarantee that
the government will not impose religious uniformity.
Yet adopting the second option (censoring the religious expres-
sion) is more than unfortunate; it is wrong for reasons addressed above
and revisited here. First, it is wrong because it allows the Establish-
ment Clause to trump the Free Speech Clause so that although the
religious speaker's expression is protected by the Free Speech
Clause,1"7 it is then muted by the Establishment Clause. There is no
textual support for this subordination of the Free Speech Clause.
Second, and related, the result is wrong because it relegates private
religious speech-usually considered high-value speech to a level of
less protection than other private high-value speech. For example,
while a student is allowed to give a nondisruptive presentation about
his trip to the Libertarian National Convention, he is not allowed to
read a story out of Genesis. This devaluation of religious speech
contradicts the framers' support for religious liberty and the First
Amendment's double protection for religious speech.
Third, it is unreasonable to make the scope of one citizen's
constitutional right subject to the erroneous perception of another
citizen. 58 To do so belies the very conception of a constitutional
right as a civil liberty of the highest order, curtailed only in the most
pressing of circumstances.
Some will argue that these three assertions fall short because of the
unique context of the topic at hand: one involving young, impression-
able, immature individuals. The Establishment Clause is perhaps most
needed by vulnerable elementary school students. Yet no court or
157. This assumes that the student expression is permissible under the Tinker standard, as
detailed in Part II.
158. Chief Justice Burger addressed this issue in his dissent in Bender v. Williamsport Area
School District:
The Court of Appeals agreed that the Establishment Clause prohibited [the student-
initiated club] from meeting on school premises because to allow it to meet could have
been misinterpreted by other students as active state support of religion. Under that
analysis, because an individual's discussion of religious beliefs may be confused by
others as being that of the State, both must be viewed as the same. Yet the several
commands of the First Amendment require vision capable of distinguishing between
state establishment of religion, which is prohibited by the Establishment Clause, and
individual participation and advocacy of religion which, far from being prohibited by
the Establishment Clause, is affirmatively protected by the Free Exercise and Free
Speech Clauses of the First Amendment. If the latter two commands are to retain any
vitality, utterly unproven, subjective impressions of some hypothetical students should
not be allowed to transform individual expression of religious belief into state advance-
ment of religion.
475 U.S. 534, 553 (1986) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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commentator has explained persuasively why the Free Speech Clause
is not also needed by elementary school students. That is, why are the
"captive speakers" not at risk, as well? Although young and articulate,
elementary school students are entitled to express their views about the
fundamental issues of life and to resist an educational environment
devoid of religious explanations of reality. It is the case that young
citizens equally need, and deserve, the rights afforded by both the
Establishment Clause and the Free Speech Clause. It is also the case
that, unlike in any other context, in the public school classroom, there
is no room for either right to "budge."
E. A Better Option
In addition to either waiving compulsory attendance or censoring
private student speech, there is a third option for school officials faced
with misperception by student listeners: teaching. Justice Brennan
pointed to this option in his Hazelwood dissent: "Dissociative means
short of censorship are available to the school."'5 9  Rather than
viewing the relationship between the Establishment Clause and the
Free Speech Clause as a "zero sum game" (where a gain for one clause
is necessarily a loss for the other) educators and lawyers alike would do
well to view the "tension" as an opportunity for an overall gain in
understanding. Even in the elementary school classroom, a teacher can
begin to explain the fundaments of religious liberty. For example:
"Each family chooses what religion, if any, it will follow. The school
doesn't interfere with that. Not everyone believes what Z.H. believes,
but the school doesn't take sides. This story is important to Z.H., and
whether we agree or disagree with him, we're going to listen to him
politely."
For those such as Justices O'Connor and Souter, who believe the
Establishment Clause requires the government to take affirmative
'steps to avoid being perceived as supporting or endorsing a private
religious message,' 160 this type of disclaimer should be sufficient. If
cases such as Oliva require Establishment Clause scrutiny-a
conclusion with which this Article disagrees-the scrutiny must be of
the government action, not the student speech. If the Establishment
Clause requires a remedy, the burden of the remedy should fall on the
school: an earnest attempt to correct misperception should be enough.
It is doctrinally untenable to ban otherwise protected student speech
just because the school is unsuccessful in curing misunderstanding.
159. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 289 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
160. Pinette, 515 U.S. at 777 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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For those such as the Justices in the Pinette plurality, a "teaching
disclaimer" by the school, in the name of the Establishment Clause,
will be doctrinally unnecessary. Yet this group would have no
constitutional objection to the practice. The practical benefits of the
disclaimer would be more religious liberty and better understanding by
students.
In Oliva, the speech at issue was "private"-i.e., Z.H.'s speech,
not the government's. Although Z.H.'s proposed expression occurred
in a classroom in which he and his classmates were compelled to be,
the classroom and the reading program were open and accessible to all
the students in the classroom. With no valid reason to attribute Z.H.'s
speech to the government, the Establishment Clause should not have
curtailed protection provided by the Free Speech Clause. At most, the
Establishment Clause required only that Ms. Oliva disclaim endorse-
ment by the school.
IV. CONCLUSION
Cases such as C.H. v. Oliva are difficult because they involve
tension within the First Amendment that is not easily resolved by text,
history, or logic. Both parties wave the banner of religious liberty and
both parties point to the First Amendment to justify their claims. The
proper first step of analysis in these cases, however, is not specific to
religious liberty. The first step is to determine whether the protection
afforded to the student's speech (religious or not) is broad enough to
make unconstitutional the school officials' restriction of the speech. If
the scope of protection is not broad enough, the school officials'
restriction is permissible and there is no colorable need for Establish-
ment Clause analysis.
Under Hazelwood, if student expression occurs in a "nonpublic
forum" and is sponsored by the school, school officials can reasonably
regulate the expression for any educational purpose. If not, under
Tinker, officials can censor the speech only if they reasonably forecast
that the expression will lead to a substantial disruption, a material
interference with the educational function, or an invasion of the rights
of others. While a public school classroom certainly is not open for
indiscriminate use by the public, as to the students compelled by law
to be in the classroom, the classroom is not a nonpublic forum because
there is virtually no restriction upon these students' access to the
classroom.
Similarly, under Hazelwood, student expression that merely
happens to occur at school is not "school-sponsored." This result is
not changed by the presence of compulsory attendance, a large number
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of speakers with the same viewpoint, or the young age of elementary
school students. School sponsorship is dependent upon a reasonable
perception that the expression bears the school's imprimatur. None of
this is to say that students have free reign in the classroom. To the
contrary, the Tinker standard-substantial disruption-will be met
more easily in the classroom than, for example, on the playground,
where it is hard to disrupt an educational function. The Tinker
standard will also be met more easily in the elementary school than in
secondary schools, given that self-discipline is more rare among
younger students.
The second fundamental step of analysis in cases such as Oliva is
specific to religious liberty. When school officials restrict student
religious speech in the classroom in a way that is impermissible under
Tinker, the question becomes whether the Establishment Clause
justifies the officials' actions. Because the Establishment Clause
restricts only government action, in order to violate the Clause, student
religious expression (or the promotion of it) must somehow be
attributable to the government. While the Supreme Court and federal
appellate courts have found Establishment Clause violations where
compulsory attendance and government sponsorship exist, these courts
have not found that compulsory attendance necessarily creates
government sponsorship. Moreover, such a finding would make all
student classroom speech attributable to the government and, hence,
subject to being prohibited by the Establishment Clause. Testing for
a violation via the "endorsement test" would lead to a similar result if
that test is interpreted to give weight to the misperception of student
listeners.
By devaluing religious speech and potentially creating a "religion
free" public classroom, each of these approaches would contradict the
intent of the framers of the Constitution and the First Amendment
text. The better approach is suggested by the plurality in Pinette,
which held that religious expression cannot violate the Establishment
Clause when it is private and occurs in a forum open to all on equal
terms. Where school officials merely allow student religious speech in
the same manner that they allow other (i.e., "secular") speech, the
Establishment Clause is not implicated.
The First Amendment should flourish as fully as possible in the
public elementary school classroom. While students (and their
parents) undoubtedly deserve the Amendment's protection against
religious indoctrination, the Amendment protects only against
indoctrination by the government. Simultaneously-and perhaps
equally as vital to resisting government indoctrination-the First
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Amendment allows students to make their own attempts at persuasion
by expressing their beliefs about matters of fundamental concern. By
applying Tinker, courts can allow this high-value, private proselytizing,
while ensuring that the expression does not unduly disrupt the
educational environment. By following Pinette, courts can guard
against eradicating private religious expression in the classroom.
